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Abstract—This paper outlines the IoT Databox model as a 
means of making the Internet of Things (IoT) accountable to 
individuals. Accountability is a key to building consumer trust and 
mandated in data protection legislation. We briefly outline the 
‘external’ data subject accountability requirement specified in 
actual legislation in Europe and proposed legislation in the US, 
and how meeting requirement this turns on surfacing the invisible 
actions and interactions of connected devices and the social 
arrangements in which they are embedded. The IoT Databox 
model is proposed as an in principle means of enabling 
accountability and providing individuals with the mechanisms 
needed to build trust in the IoT. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
While the Internet of Things (IoT) holds great social and 
economic promise, it is accompanied by deep-seated concerns 
that drive new approaches to data protection in Europe and the 
US. The EU has adopted new General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), which will come into force in 2018 [1], and 
the US is reconsidering the proposed Consumer Privacy Bill of 
Rights [2,3,4]. Key to both is the notion of accountability, which 
refers to the demonstrable implementation of enforceable 
privacy policies and procedures. Any organisation using IoT 
technologies to process personal data in these economic zones 
will have to comply with the accountability requirement. 
Two fundamental categories of accountability are to be 
found in actual and proposed legislation: ‘internal’ and 
‘external’. Internal accountability refers to the policies and 
procedures that a data processing entity puts in place to 
demonstrate to itself that its processing operations comply with 
the requirements of data protection regulation (e.g., privacy 
impact assessments). More relevant to this paper is the notion of 
‘external’ accountability, which refers to the policies and 
procedures a data processing entity puts in place to demonstrate 
to others that its operations are legally compliant. Those ‘others’ 
fall into two categories: regulatory authorities, and the ‘data 
subjects’ or individuals whose data is processed. The individual 
accountability requirement concerns us here.  
In the following section we briefly outline the individual 
accountability requirement as given in actual and proposed 
legislation and how it has been translated into ‘best practice 
recommendations’ for IoT developers by data protection 
agencies. These recommendations seek to enable individual 
control over the flow of personal data through the design of 
computational mechanisms that make data collection 
transparent, enable consent, and permit fine-grained data flow 
management, data portability and access. Satisfying the 
accountability requirement requires that we surface and 
articulate hidden aspects of the IoT: not only machine-to-
machine or M2M actions and interactions but also, and 
importantly, the social arrangements connected devices are 
embedded in, for it is not only the data collected by Internet-
enabled ‘things’ that must be made accountable but also what is 
done with that data and by whom.  
We outline the IoT Databox model as a means of making 
device actions and interactions and the social or cooperative 
arrangements they are embedded in transparent to enable 
accountability. The IoT Databox is an edge device intended to 
be situated within the home. It collates data from IoT devices, 
either directly or via APIs, and makes them available to ‘apps’ 
that enable data processing and actuation. Data processing takes 
place on-the-box. This has a range of potential benefits including 
resilience (actuation does not need to rely on continuous 
connectivity), low latency (data does not have to be moved to 
and from remote data centres), efficiency (centralised data 
processing costs are significantly reduced), and data 
minimisation (only the results of processing queries are 
distributed). Making the IoT accountable may, then, have 
manifold advantages. 
II. THE ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIREMENT 
The accountability requirement plays a key role in the 
processing of personal data. ‘Personal data’ are any data that 
relate to an identifiable person, including data generated by 
connected devices. ‘Processing’ includes collecting, using, 
retaining, disclosing and/or disposing of personal data. In 
addition to specifying that personal data processing be 
conducted under the auspices of the ‘data minimisation’ 
principle (Article 5), EU legislation or GDPR [1] specifies that 
data processing should also be lawful. The lawfulness of data 
processing turns in significant part upon satisfying the external 
data subject accountability requirement, particularly a number 
of matters to do with ‘consent’ as laid out in Articles 6 to 22.  
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These include (but are not limited to) specifying the purposes 
of data processing, the period for which data will be stored, 
whether or not the data will be transferred to an international 
organisation or third country, and the level of protection 
afforded in such circumstances by reference to an adequacy 
decision by the European Commission. Data reuse does not 
require consent if reuse is compatible with the original purposes 
for which data was gathered [5]. Data subjects must be 
informed of their rights, including the right of access and the 
right to lodge a complaint (Article 15) the right to rectification 
(Article 16), the right to be forgotten and to erasure (Article 17), 
the right to data portability (Article 20), and the right not to be 
subject to measures which produce legal effects based solely on 
automated processing, including profiling (Article 22). Where 
automated decision-making, including profiling, is applied the 
logic, significance and envisaged consequences of data 
processing must be conveyed to the individual (Article 13).  The 
required information must be provided in an intelligible form, 
using clear and plain language (Article 12), and at the time 
when data is obtained (Article 13).  
Consent is a legal requirement of all personal data processing 
operations in Europe, except for specified exemptions including 
those done for personal or household purposes or purposes. Data 
processing occurring in such contexts is exempt from proposed 
regulation. However, the exemption does not apply “to 
controllers or processors which provide the means for 
processing personal data for such personal or household 
activities” [1, paragraph 18]. ‘Controllers’ are parties who 
commission data processing. ‘Processors’ are parties who act on 
the controller’s behalf, and may include computational 
machines. Failure to comply with the external data subject 
accountability requirement may result in a fine of up to 4% of an 
organisation’s annual worldwide turnover. 
While the US proposal is voluntary, and such punitive 
sanctions are therefore absent, the emphasis on external data 
subject accountability is just as pronounced and enshrined in 6 
of the 7 principles that underpin the proposed Consumer Privacy 
Bill of Rights Act of 2015 [2]; the other principle focuses on 
security (Section 105). The first of these principles, 
Transparency (section 101), stipulates that individuals should be 
provided with clear descriptions of the personal data to be 
collected and processed, data retention policies, access 
mechanisms, and any other entities the data will be disclosed to. 
The Individual Control principle (Section 102), stipulates that 
individuals should be provided with reasonable means to control 
personal data processing, including means to withdraw or limit 
consent that are as easily used as methods for granting consent 
in the first place.  
The Respect for Context principle (Section 103) stipulates 
that data should be processed in a manner that is reasonable “in 
light of context” and otherwise implement “heightened” 
transparency and individual control. The Focused Collection 
and Responsible Use principle (Section 104) stipulates that an 
entity may only collect, retain, and use personal data in a manner 
that is reasonable “in light of context”. The Access and Accuracy 
principle (Section 106) stipulates that individuals must be 
provided with reasonable access to, or an accurate representation 
of, personal data under the control of the processing entity, and 
means to dispute and resolve accuracy or completeness to avoid 
“adverse” consequences. The Accountability principle (Section 
107) stipulates that data processing entities should build 
appropriate consideration for privacy and data protections into 
the design of its systems and practices. 
While actual and proposed legislation is clearly different in 
the EU and US, the emphasis on external accountability to the 
individual is pronounced in both. This is unsurprising insofar as 
both are built on shared Fair Information Practice principles [6]. 
These principles encourage processing data for specific 
purposes, and for purposes that are contextually consistent or 
compatible with those for which data was originally collected, 
and mandate the provision of information about data processing 
to individuals in ways that clearly describe the purposes of data 
processing, data retention policies, data transfer policies, data 
access policies, etc.  
Accountability thus ‘frames’ the processing of personal data, 
i.e., it does not specify how accountability is to be achieved, only 
what it must consist of and amount to, a matter succinctly 
summed up in the 2012 draft of proposed US bill: 
“Accountability refers to a company’s capacity to demonstrate 
the implementation of enforceable policies and procedures 
relating to privacy (whether adopted voluntarily or as a result of 
legal obligations) [4].” Making data processing accountable to 
the individual whose data is processed is key to the 
demonstration. Furthermore, it is a demonstration that must be 
provided by any party using the IoT to process personal data in 
Europe, and it may soon be a requirement in the US. 
III. SUPPORTING THE ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIREMENT 
The primary purpose of the accountability requirement is to 
demonstrably put the individual “in control of their own data” 
[1] and to enable them “to control how personal data flows in 
the digital economy” [4]. Historically, the accountability 
requirement has been treated as a non-functional requirement; a 
matter of providing information to enable decision-making (so 
called ‘notice and choice’). However, ‘best practice 
recommendations’ from data protection agencies in Europe and 
the US - the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party or WP29 
and the Federal Trade Commission or FTC respectively – make 
it clear that the accountability requirement is now a functional 
requirement to be implemented through design. 
Thus, the FTC [7] proposes a number of practical measures 
to put the individual in control of personal data generated by IoT 
devices. These include “general privacy menus” enabling the 
application of user-defined privacy levels across all of their IoT 
devices by default; the use of icons on IoT devices to “quickly 
convey” important settings and attributes, such as when a device 
is connected to the Internet and to enable users to quickly “toggle 
the connection on or off”; the use of “out of band 
communications” to relay important privacy and security 
settings to the user via other channels, e.g., via email or SMS, 
and the use of management portals or “dashboards” that enable 
users to configure IoT devices and accompanying privacy 
settings: “Properly implemented, such ‘dashboard’ approaches 
can allow consumers clear ways to determine what information 
they agree to share (ibid.).”  
WP29 [8] also proposes a number of practical measures to 
facilitate the application of EU legal requirements to the IoT. 
These include providing users with “granular choices” over data 
collection, including the time and frequency at which data are 
captured, and scheduling options to “quickly disable” data 
capture. Users should also be in a position to administrate IoT 
devices and easily export their data in a “structured and 
commonly-used format”. Furthermore, settings should be 
provided that enable users to distinguish between different 
individuals using shared devices so that they cannot learn about 
each other’s activities. Data portability aside, these 
recommendations complement the dashboard approach 
recommended by the FTC, insofar as they are concerned to put 
computational mechanisms in place that allow end-users to 
specify privacy settings and thereby constrain the flow of data 
between one another and the wider world.  
Thus accountability essentially becomes a matter of enabling 
individual control over the flow of personal data through the 
design of computational mechanisms that make data collection 
transparent, enable consent, and permit fine-grained data flow 
management, data portability and access. The transparency 
specification makes it necessary to surface and articulate hidden 
aspects of the IoT. Not only M2M actions and interactions 
implicated in data processing, which are largely invisible at this 
moment in time [9], but also the social arrangements those 
device interactions are embedded in [10]. This is necessary as it 
is not only the data collected by Internet-enabled ‘things’ that 
must be made accountable and subject to individual control, but 
also what is done with that data and by whom. In short, it is 
necessary to make devices, data controller’s and their processors 
accountable too. 
The WP29 recommendations add one further specification to 
the accountability requirement: “Device manufacturers should 
enable local controlling and processing entities allowing users to 
have a clear picture of data collected by their devices and 
facilitating local storage and processing without having to 
transmit the data to the device manufacturer [8].” One 
implication of this is that a great deal of the IoT data processing 
that currently takes place in the cloud is moved to the edge of 
the network to enable local control, thus minimising if not 
entirely dispensing with the distribution of personal data and the 
privacy threat that accompanies data distribution. In doing so, 
there is the added benefit of resilience in actuation, low 
computing and communications latency, and a significant 
reduction in data processing costs. 
 
Fig. 1. Implementing the Accountability Requirement: The IoT Databox Model. 
IV. THE IOT DATABOX 
The IoT Databox model provides an in principle means of 
implementing the accountability requirement. The model 
extends the Databox concept [11] to incorporate the IoT. The 
Databox concept posits a physical device as a gateway to a 
distributed platform and is predicated on the ‘Dataware 
model’ [12]. The model is a socio-technical model which 
implicates the user (by or about whom data is created), data 
sources (e.g., connected devices, which generate data about the 
user), a personal container (which collates the data produced by 
data sources and can be accessed via APIs), a catalogue (which 
allows the user to manage access to the personal container), and 
data processors (external machines exploited by data controllers 
who wish to make use of the user’s data in some way).  
The Dataware model is a logical entity formed as a 
distributed computing system. Data processing involves 
requests being sent to the catalogue, which are approved or 
rejected by the user. If approved, the catalogue issues a 
processing token to the data processor for permitted requests. 
The processor presents the token to the personal container, 
which accepts the token, runs the processing request on the 
relevant data sources, and then returns processed results to the 
data controller. The Dataware model represents a distinctive 
approach to personal data processing, that not only seeks to 
enable user control but also data minimisation. Thus, the 
Dataware model takes a significant step towards implementing 
the local control recommendation, minimising data sharing to 
the results of processing. The raw data remains ‘on the box’ 
under the users control.  
The Dataware model is currently being reconfigured around 
the Databox concept, which embeds the Dataware model in a 
physical object situated in the physical environment (e.g., a 
networked mini-computer in the home) under the direct control 
of the individual. It allows the individual to collate data from an 
array of data sources in a single place and allows the individual 
to control access to them. Data from individual data sources is 
stored in ‘unikernels’, i.e., containerised, application-specific, 
virtual machines that reduce the attack surface and management 
problems associated with general purpose operating systems.  
Architecturally the IoT Databox model consists of three key 
components: the Databox, the app store, and a controller’s 
processors (Fig.1). The Databox is a small form factor (x86 or 
ARM) computer consisting of a web server and webapp 
containing the dashboard (Fig.2), which enables individuals to: 
• Create User Accounts on the Databox and activate sharing 
permissions (e.g., that consent from all users of shared 
resources is required for delete actions). 
• Add Data Sources to the box, including assigning 
ownership to data sources, annotating data sources (e.g., 
smart plug XYZ is ‘the kettle’), and sharing data sources 
with other Databox users. 
• Configure Drivers to enable data sources to write to data 
stores. 
• Manage Data Stores, including sharing stores with other 
Databox users, and redacting, clearing, or deleting stores. 
• Access App Stores, apps are recommended by the box 
based on available data sources but individuals can also 
search for, download, and rate apps. 
• Share Apps, with other Databox users within the home and 
between distributed Databoxes in other homes; the 
Dashboard also allows apps to be updated and deleted. 
• Receive Notifications, including sharing requests, app 
updates, resource contention, etc. 
• Audit data processing operation, including all accesses to 
data stores, and any data transactions.  
 
Fig. 2. The IoT Databox Dashboard. 
The app store is a cloud-based service, interacted with using 
standard internet protocols (principally HTTPS). It consists of a 
web server that provides the app store UI supporting human 
interaction, and a query API providing for programmatic 
(machine-based) interaction. The app store manages a docker 
repository of apps, which are uploaded via the app submission 
API and are indexed by associated metadata. App developers are 
free to create their own containerised apps as they wish, but the 
apps store provides a dedicated app SDK supporting the app 
building and publication process. This is a cloud-hosted visual 
code editor based on IBM’s open source Node-RED, which 
utilises a flow-based programming paradigm in which black-box 
processes called ‘nodes’ are connected together to form 
applications called ‘flows’.  
There are three principle node types: data sources, processes 
and outputs. Process nodes are functions that operate on data; 
they typically have a single input connection and one or more 
output connections. Output nodes typically perform an action, 
such as actuation, visualisation, or data export. Figure 3 depicts 
a flow taking the output from a microphone on a mobile phone, 
visualises its amplitude on a graph and turns a plug on or off 
when the amplitude exceeds a particular value. It is composed 
of a single data source (the yellow node), two processes (the two 
blue nodes) and two outputs (the orange nodes). 
 
Fig. 3. The App SDK. 
The app editor smooths and simplifies the build / test / deploy 
development workflow; it presents a high-level abstraction (e.g. 
an app developer can build an app without needing to be familiar 
with the interoperation between sources, stores and drivers); it 
provides ‘scaffolding’ to help build an app, e.g., developers can 
quickly inspect the structure and type of data entering and 
exiting a node; it provides a full testing environment, where 
flows are deployed (as containers) and connected to test data; 
and it handles the app publication process by presenting tools for 
building a manifest enabling end-user consent and granular 
choice (Fig.4); and, upon submission, containerising an app and 
uploading it to an app store. The SDK also takes care of source 
code management as all stages of the app development cycle are 
recorded in a developer’s GitHub account. 
On receipt of an app, the app store reviews and rates it based 
on its features and information provided, e.g., the absence of a 
data access API would result in a poor rating if data was taken 
off-the-box by an app (user ratings and reviews are also 
displayed alongside apps on the app store). An app cannot be 
posted on the app store or installed on the IoT Databox without 
a manifest being in place, and data cannot be transferred to a 
controller’s processors without a manifest being completed by 
the data subject. Manifests are dynamic, user-configurable 
‘multi-layered notices’ [13] that surface and articulate who 
wants to access which connected devices and what they want to 
process personal data for. Thus manifests make specific socio-
technical data processing arrangements, implicating connected 
devices, data controller’s and their processors accountable to 
individuals and available to local control. 
Manifests provide an easy to read description of the purposes 
of processing and service options, the benefits of data 
processing, and the risks that potentially attach to particular 
categories of data (e.g., that occupancy can be inferred from C02 
data). The manifest allows the data subject to exercise fine-
grained granular choice over data collection, configuring which 
data sources may be used at which sampling frequencies. This 
may reduce the service options that are available to the 
individual, which is dynamically reflected in the manifest. 
Mandatory information required by data protection legislation is 
provided in the ‘condensed’ and ‘full’ layers of the manifest.  
Once a manifest has been configured by the individual and 
has been ‘accepted’ it assumes the status of a Service Level 
Agreement or SLA, which the IoT Databox transforms into a set 
of machine readable policies that enforce a data processor’s 
access to the particular data sources agreed upon by the 
individual and regulate subsequent data processing operations. 
Data sources implicated in an SLA may be changed, e.g., to 
replace a faulty sensor, and settings can be updated to enable 
new service options. Apps, like data stores, run within isolated 
containers and interact with data stores to perform a specified 
(‘purposeful’) task. Thus apps may query data stores, write to a 
communications data store and send query results to external 
machines, or write to a connected device’s store to perform 
actuation. Data stores record all actions performed on them 
(queries, external transactions and actuation) in an audit log. 
Access to data stores and processing restrictions are determined 
by an app’s SLA and enforced by the arbiter, which issues and 
manages the use of access tokens. 
 
Fig. 4. The IoT Databox manifest/SLA. 
An app may implement data processing, including actuation, 
locally and entail no transfer of data off-the-box, thus meeting 
the local control recommendation [8]. A manifest/SLA will still 
be required but no further components are needed in this 
scenario. Apps transferring the results of local processing meet 
the data minimisation principle [1]. Nevertheless, where an app 
exports data, even if only the results of processing, then the data 
controller is responsible for providing a secure data endpoint 
and an encrypted connection for data transfer, which the box will 
monitor. Controllers are also encouraged to provide a data 
access API. While access is a requirement of proposed 
legislation, it is not mandatory in the IoT Databox model as it is 
not enforceable. However, and as noted above, that an app does 
not support data access may be leveraged as a visible 
disincentive for individuals to use it. 
The IoT Databox model thus puts in place a set of 
interactional arrangements and supporting system architecture 
that enables demonstrable compliance with legislation, actual 
and proposed, providing the transparency and consent, granular 
choice, data portability (data is on the box), and potential access 
needed to meet the external data subject accountability 
requirement. Insofar as apps satisfy the local control 
recommendation, keeping data processing on-the-box, then the 
IoT Databox model arguably circumvents the need for data 
protection regulation at all, as no data is handed over to an 
organisation for processing. Insofar as processed data might be 
exchanged, then the IoT Databox model enforces the data 
minimisation principle and creates incentives for data 
controllers and their processors to comply with the requirements 
of regulation in furnishing data access APIs: “Where possible, 
the controller should be able to provide remote access to a secure 
system which would provide the data subject with direct access 
to his or her personal data [1, paragraph 63].” Of course, in an 
IoT Databox world, such access will be a readily accountable 
and mundane feature of app use. 
V. CONCLUSION 
“Data protection must move from ‘theory to practice’ … 
accountability based mechanisms have been suggested as a 
way of … implement[ing] practical tools for effective data 
protection [14].”  
This paper has sought to explore how data protection might 
move from theory to practice with respect to connected devices 
through the development of accountability based mechanisms 
provided by the IoT Databox model. The model seeks to respond 
to the external data subject accountability requirement of actual 
and proposed legislation in Europe and the US. This user-facing 
requirement seeks to make data collection transparent, enable 
consent, permit fine-grained data flow management, data 
portability, and access, and allow entities that process personal 
data to demonstrate that these measures are in place.  
The IoT Databox model responds to the accountability 
requirement’s shift in functional status and provides for the 
demonstration by surfacing interactions between connected 
devices and data processors, and articulating the social actors 
and activities in which machine-to-machine interactions are 
embedded, through the construction of manifests that 
accompany (and must accompany) data processing apps and 
tools (dashboards and app stores) to manage app use. In adopting 
the local control principle to ensure the individual can control 
the flow of personal data, the IoT Databox model enhances the 
efficiency of data processing, makes actuation more resilient, 
minimises the impact of IoT traffic on the network, and negates 
the need for costly privacy regimes: if no data is taken off the 
box then there is no need for data protection. Insofar as it is 
possible for data processing and data to demonstrably stay on-
the-box then the IoT Databox model also holds the promise of 
opening up personal data as never before, allowing data 
processing across manifold sources of personal data rather than 
single connected devices. 
The IoT Databox model is not a theoretical model. It exists, 
albeit in nascent form [15]. It enables data controllers and app 
developers working on their behalf to demonstrate compliance 
with the external data subject accountability requirement of 
actual and proposed legislation. It’s ability to support local 
computation minimises and even circumvents the widespread 
threat to privacy occasioned by the IoT. And in circumventing 
the privacy threat, it opens up new possibilities for exploiting 
personal data in ways that may demonstrably build consumer 
trust in the digital economy.  
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
The work reported here was supported by EPSRC research 
grants EP/M001636/1, EP/N028260/1 and EP/M02315X/1.  
REFERENCES 
[1] General Data Protection Regulation, in Official Journal of the European 
Union, vol. 59, pp. 1-88, May 2016.  
[2] Chernichaw, A. and Freeman, B.C., “White House Re-introduces 
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act”, in White & Case Newsflash, April 
2015.  
[3] Adminstration Discussion Draft: Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 
2015,https://www.democraticmedia.org/sites/default/files/field/public/20
15/draft_consumer_privacy_bill_of_rights_act.pdf 
[4] Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for 
Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital 
Economy, in Journal of Privacy and Confidentiality, vol. 4  (2) , pp. 95-
142, March 2013. 
[5] WP203 Opinion 03/2013 on Purpose Limitation, Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, April 2013. 
[6] Gellman, R., Fair Information Practices: A Basic History,  2016. 
http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf 
[7] Internet of Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World, FTC Staff 
Report, January 2015. 
[8] WP233 Opinion 8/2014 on Recent Developments on the Internet of 
Things, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, September 2014. 
[9] Ziegeldorf, J., Morchon, O. and Wehrle, K., “Privacy in the Internet of 
Things: threats and challenges”, in Security and Communication 
Networks, vol. 7 (12), pp. 2728-2742, 2014. 
[10] Robertson, T. and Wagner, I., “CSCW and the Internet of Things”, in 
Proc. of ECSCW, pp. 285-294, Oslo, Springer, 2015. 
[11] Chaudry A., Crowcroft J., Howard H., Madhavapeddy A., Mortier R., 
Haddadi H. and McAuley, D., “Personal data: thinking inside the box”, in 
Proc. of Critical Alternatives, pp. 29-32, Aarhus, ACM, 2015. 
[12] McAuley, D., Mortier, R. and Goulding, J., “The dataware manifesto”, in 
Proc. of 3rd International Conference on Communication Systems and 
Networks, pp. 1-6, Bangalore, IEEE, 2011. 
[13] WP202 Opinion 02/2013 on Apps and Smart Devices, Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, February 2013. 
[14] WP173 Opinion 3/2010 on The Principle of Accountability, Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, July 2010. 
[15] The Databox Project, http://www.databoxproject.uk/code/     
